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ABSTRACT 
 
I examine how two partner attributes alter a firm’s innovative performance stemming 
from access to structural holes in its network of R&D alliances. My results suggest that effects of 
access to structural holes are modified individually and jointly by (i) partners’ technological 
resources and (ii) partners’ access to structural holes. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the past few decades, the proliferation of interfirm R&D alliances has caused the 
emergence of R&D networks. The alliances a firm occupies in the structure of such networks, 
determining its ‘network position’, influence its opportunities and performance in a number of 
ways (e.g., Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). Work 
building on Burt (1992) argues that a firm achieves higher innovative performance by 
maintaining alliances to others that are not directly connected. The lack of direct connections 
among a firm’s partners, signifying the presence of ‘structural holes’, indicates that these partners 
operate in distinct parts of the network, increasing the likelihood that they carry heterogeneous 
information. The focal firm’s position at the intersection of such heterogeneous sources of 
information provides it with an advantage as it is more likely than others to develop novel, 
innovative ideas. Empirical evidence abound, see Burt (2004) for a review of the literature. 
Building on accumulated evidence on the main effect of structural holes in shaping firm-
level advantages, recent work has started to investigate its scope conditions. Thus far, scholars 
found that advantages are not universal, but rather contingent on attributes of the focal firm (e.g., 
Baum et al., 2000) and relational and industry attributes (e.g., Rowley et al., 2000). In this paper I 
propose that the main effect of access to structural holes masks yet another set of contingencies. 
My focus is on the partner attributes that shape the advantages of access to structural holes, 
which have remained largely unexplored (cf. Gulati, 2007: 265). The scant attention to partner 
contingencies in studies of interfirm cooperative networks is remarkable, as theories of interfirm 
learning suggest that, net of industry attributes and trends, the transfer of knowledge between 
firms is a function of the focal and partner firms and their relationships (Greve, 2005). 
In the context of an interfirm R&D network, I focus on two partner contingencies 
imposed on the performance association of a firm’s access to structural holes with its innovative 
performance: (i) partners’ amount of technological resources and (ii) partners’ access to structural 
holes. The former is nodal: partners that possess many technological resources could upgrade the 
advantages associated with a firm’s access to structural holes. The latter is structural: the value of 
access to structural holes could diminish if partners have access to structural holes as well. 
I examined these ideas using data on an interfirm R&D network in IT between 1975 and 
1999, in which learning and innovation through alliances has been a salient aspect of firms’ 
operations (and has become increasingly so, see Frankort, 2008). 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
A network position rich in structural holes confers two related benefits upon a firm: (i) 
access to unique, heterogeneous sources of information and (ii) control over the information’s 
dispersion (Burt, 1992). The baseline prediction is that a firm that has access to more structural 
holes is, on average, more likely to develop innovative knowledge. Two partner attributes may 
alter the innovative value of accessing structural holes: (i) partners differ in the amount of 
technological endowments, and (ii) partners differ in their access to structural holes. 
 
The Moderating Role of Partners’ Technological Resources 
 
In R&D alliances, partners’ technological resources are an important source of learning 
(Stuart, 2000). Larger amounts of technological resources in a firm’s R&D network enrich the 
opportunity set a firm faces (Baum et al., 2000; Silverman & Baum, 2002). This opportunity set 
is twofold. First, the more external technological resources, the higher the amount of unique 
combinations a firm potentially perceives when monitoring its partners’ technologies. This 
increases its vision advantage of access to structural holes. Second, the firm’s capacity to develop 
and implement such novel combinations increases because the technological resources of its 
partners complement the focal firm’s internal technological capabilities. 
A firm accessing structural holes among partners that are technologically well endowed 
may thus innovate more for two related reasons. First, its vision advantage amplifies because it 
not only connects heterogeneous sources of information, it also samples from a larger opportunity 
set. Second, its capacity to realize its visions increases because the technological resources of its 
partners could complement the focal firm’s internal technological capabilities. 
 
H 1: The more technological resources the R&D alliance partners of a firm possess, the stronger 
the relationship between that firm’s structural holes and its subsequent innovative performance. 
 
The Moderating Role of Partners’ Access to Structural Holes 
 
Some work suggests that the influence of network structure on firm performance reaches 
beyond the firm’s direct contacts. Yet, how this happens remains unclear. Here, I explore some of 
the mechanisms and ask the following question: what is the influence of partners’ (lack of) 
access to structural holes on the focal firm’s innovative returns to spanning structural holes? In 
answering this question, I assume that the most consequential influence of the larger network 
structure lies in the structure of network ties directly surrounding the firm’s direct partners. 
In R&D alliances, firms will create learning asymmetries by drawing knowledge into their 
firm and, at the same time, controlling its diffusion to partners. They have an incentive to absorb 
knowledge, while revealing as little as possible. The degree to which learning asymmetries 
benefit the focal firm is not only determined by its access to structural holes, but also by the 
degree to which its partners are positioned ‘strategically’—attracting knowledge and ideas by 
accessing structural holes themselves. If a firm and its partners all have access to structural holes, 
they may initiate learning races, which significantly hinders the focal firm’s learning efforts. 
Indeed, Silverman and Baum (2002) showed that, although they provide a firm with higher 
survival prospects, the structural holes among its alliance partners significantly diminish the 
latter’s chances of survival—suggesting that such structural holes intensify competition between 
alliance partners. 
In contrast, if the partners of a firm that spans structural holes do not span structural holes 
themselves—the firm thus spans structural holes among firms which are themselves part of 
cohesive groups—the firm will experience fewer difficulties in benefiting from its network 
position. The collective nature of cohesive ties surrounding the partners may instill in them a 
predisposition to portray cooperative behaviors that transcend the borders of their group. 
In the highly competitive setting of R&D alliances, superfluous structural holes may 
create role conflicts among firms in the larger R&D network. This is at odds with the division of 
labor foundational to structural differentiation in such networks. Most firms cluster around core 
activities to specialize in designing and developing specific technologies and products. Some of 
them bridge such clusters, allowing the identification of novel combinations of specialized 
knowledge. Coordinating flows of specialized knowledge may demand from such firms much 
more knowledge of the norms, practices, and technologies of partners’ cohesive groups and 
demands an ability to translate across distinct contexts (cf. Burt, 2008). However, the premium 
could be large as distinctness of the groups reduces the degree to which the collected bits of 
knowledge exhibit overlap. This sparks the pursuit of novel combinations, possibly resulting in 
enhanced innovative performance. 
 
H 2: The more the R&D alliance partners of a firm have access to structural holes, the weaker 
the relationship between the firm’s own structural holes and its subsequent innovative 
performance. 
 
The Cumulative Effect of Partners’ Resources and Their Network Positioning 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that two partner-level phenomena moderate the firm-level 
returns to accessing structural holes in an R&D network independently of one another. However, 
firms that access structural holes and also hold a strong stock of technological resources may use 
their network structural advantages to expropriate their partners’ knowledge, while 
simultaneously shielding their technological resource base as much as possible (Khanna, Gulati, 
& Nohria, 1998). Hence, if a firm’s partners also have direct access to structural holes, the firm’s 
access to technological resources may be constrained significantly. As such, partners’ network 
positioning could reduce the focal firm’s access to external technological resources. This effect is 
a matter of degree: a firm that spans structural holes among technologically well-endowed 
partners may be innovative, but likely less so if the latter span structural holes as well. 
 
H 3: The more the R&D alliance partners of a firm have access to structural holes, the weaker 
the positive, interactive effect of that firm’s own structural holes and its partners’ technological 
resources on its subsequent innovative performance. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 My sample consisted of IT firms engaged in R&D alliances—both bilateral contracts and 
equity joint ventures—during the period 1975-1999. The IT sector includes firms active in 
computers, semiconductors, communications, and related materials, covering patent classes for 
Communications, Computer Hardware & Software, Computer Peripherals, Information Storage 
and Semiconductor Devices. I used part of the dataset described in Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, 
and Jaffe (2006), which I complemented with data from the CATI database on interfirm 
technology alliances (Hagedoorn, 2002), the NBER patent data file (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 
2002), Compustat, Osiris, Datastream, the SEC and 10K filings, the U.S. Census Bureau, 
Eurostat, firms’ annual reports, and numerous press releases. The final dataset was an unbalanced 
panel of firm-year records. 
I used a firm’s annual number of successful patent applications as measure for its 
innovative performance (i.e. a patent granted in year B yet filed in year A is counted in year A). 
Throughout the analyses, this variable took a one-year lead to all independent variables for two 
reasons. First, it is plausible that some time elapses before R&D alliances translate into patent 
applications. Second, a lead specification, providing a clear temporal separation of cause and 
effect, avoids part of the econometric problems related to the simultaneity of cooperation and 
innovation. Results of models that use longer leads are generally weaker. 
I used three independent variables to form the interaction terms to test my hypotheses. 
These variables were based on annual adjacency matrices reflecting all R&D alliances among IT 
firms for a window of three years. For most R&D alliances end dates were not reported, but the 
small number of alliances for which they were (less than ten percent) revealed an average alliance 
horizon of three years. Results using other horizons were broadly similar. First, I used Burt’s 
(1992: 54-55) measure of constraint and inverted it to obtain a value for a firm’s access to 
structural holes. Second, access to structural holes by a firm’s partners was captured by their 
average inversed values of network constraint. Third, I calculated the average count of patent 
citations received by its R&D alliance partners to obtain a measure for the technological resources 
of a firm’s partners. Alternative measures generated largely identical results. 
I included a range of controls for characteristics of the focal firm, its partners, the 
relationship between the two, and region and time. First, I controlled for the focal firm’s number 
of R&D alliances, R&D alliance experience, R&D intensity, profitability, size, and technological 
opportunities. Second, I controlled for partners’ average number of R&D alliances, R&D 
intensity, and size. Third, I controlled for characteristics of the alliance relationships between the 
focal firm and its partners: the share of joint ventures in all R&D alliances of the firm, the average 
knowledge overlap with its partners, the regional heterogeneity of the firm and its partners, and 
the product-market overlap between the two. Also, I included geographic and year dummies. 
To test the models predicting a firm’s innovative performance, a count of patents, I used 
conditional fixed-effect negative binomial regressions. This approach assumes strict exogeneity of 
independent variables with respect to the dependent variable. However, I may not escape from 
endogeneity here, as some work has suggested that a firm’s innovative performance may spark 
consecutive investments in R&D alliances (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Several 
additional analyses in the framework of 2SLS fail to support endogenous relationships between 
the main independent variables and innovative performance. This suggests that more innovative 
firms are not more likely than less innovative ones to sort into network positions rich in structural 
holes. Further analyses apt for analyzing dynamics in count data processes should reveal whether 
these tentative 2SLS results persist. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 The results of my analysis (summarized in Table 1) broadly support my hypotheses. First, 
partners’ technological resources significantly enhance a firm’s innovative advantage of spanning 
structural holes. Second, partners’ structural holes significantly reduce a firm’s innovative 
advantage of spanning structural holes. Third, partners’ technological resources and their 
structural holes seem to jointly moderate the relation between a firm’s structural holes and its 
innovative performance. These results are robust across a number of different specifications. The 
main effect of access to structural holes is consistently positive and significant, whereas the main 
effect of partners’ access to structural holes is consistently negative and significant. Net of 
partners’ size, their technological resources are positive and significant throughout. 
 
----------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
----------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study has extended research on the scope conditions of a firm’s advantages related to 
access to structural holes by examining two partner-level contingencies: (1) partners’ 
technological resources and (2) partners’ access to structural holes. Results of a longitudinal 
analysis indicated that a firm’s innovative returns of access to structural holes vary systematically 
with these contingencies. As such, it begins to answer calls for a more extensive analysis of 
salient partner attributes that are foundational to value creation in interfirm networks (e.g., Gulati, 
2007). These findings have implications for our understanding of the relationship between 
cooperative R&D and firm-level innovation. They also take a step forward in advancing our 
understanding of the link between micro- and macro-level network structures (cf. Baum, Van 
Liere, & Rowley, 2006, and Burt, 2008). 
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TABLE 1 
 
Panel Regression Results
1 
 
Variable H Direction Significance (p<value) 
Firm’s structural holes × 
partners’ technological resources 
1 + 0.001 
Firm’s structural holes × 
partners’ structural holes 
2 - 0.01 
Firm’s structural holes × 
partners’ technological resources × 
partners’ structural holes 
3 - 0.05 
1
 Firm-level innovative performance, measured as a patenting rate, is the dependent 
variable. All main effects and controls are included, but not reported here. The full model 
significantly advances base-level predictions. 
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